Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: The Welfare Implications by Viton, Philip A. & Winston, Clifford M.
[Vol. 129:1516;
DISCUSSION
PASSING ON THE MONOPOLY OVERCHARGE:
THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
PHILIP A. VrrON t AND CLIFFORD M. WINSTON#if
In an Article published recently in this Review,' Professors
Robert Harris and Lawrence Sullivan provide a sustained and effec-
tive rebuttal to certain questions of economic theory and evidence
that disturbed the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois.2 In that case, the Court prevented the ultimate consumer
of a good, whose production - at some stage before the final sale is
subject to an exercise of market power, from obtaining antitrust
redress against the exerciser of that power. Contrary to the view
of the Court, however, Harris and Sullivan argue that (1) it is
possible,4 and not exorbitantly difficult or costly,5 to identify the
extent to which a "monopoly overcharge" will be passed on in
subsequent stages of production; (2) it is likely, given our knowledge
of United States industrial structure, that this extent is very high,6
and (3) if a stage of production exercising the market power were
successfully sued by the next stage, any antitrust damages recovered
would be a lump-sum windfall and not necessarily "passed back"
to the consumers in the form of lower prices.7 Hence, in Harris
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1 Harris & Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive
Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 269 (1979).
2 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
3 To restrict the number of technical terms, we use the word "production" to
signify either production or distribution.
4 Harris & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 275-99, 315-21
5 Id. 321-38.
6 Id. 290-94, 321-38. Curiously, Harris and Sullivan argue that the rate of pass-
ing on might even exceed 100% in certain instances. Id. 303-09. One might doubt
whether, in a case in which a stage of production is subject to an overcharge of
one dollar and then "passes on" an overcharge of two dollars, the correct way to
describe it is "passing on."
7 Id. 298-99.
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and Sullivan's view, the ruling of the Court in Illinois Brick
represents an almost certain reduction of consumer welfare.8
These conclusions, among other matters, have been subse-
quently challenged by Professors William Landes and Richard
Posner 9 and defended by Harris and Sullivan 10 in a recent ex-
change in this Review. In our view, however, this discussion did
not alter the validity of the original three claims made by Harris
and Sullivan. This is hardly surprising because the analysis of the
economics of passing-on "I is an uncontroversial application of tax-
incidence theory. On the other hand, the status of the welfare
conclusion is less clear, and as formulated by Harris and Sullivan
may indeed be wrong.12
The difficulty arises because Harris and Sullivan restrict their
analysis to the case of a single chain of economic activity.' 3 This
approach-known technically as "partial equilibrium analysis"-is
perfectly valid when the unconsidered part of the economy is
roughly' 4 competitive. In that situation, any exercise of market
power leads to an unambiguous deadweight welfare loss to society.'5
When the rest of the economy contains substantial noncom-
petitive sectors, however, the results change. Indeed, the following
81t is interesting to ask whether the Court's decision in Illinois Brick is the
result of the changing composition of the Supreme Court as justice Douglas once
charged. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 527 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). For an analysis of the Court's antitrust decisions, and
whether they depend on the political affiliations of the individual Justices, see Viton,
Deciding Antitrust Cases in the Supreme Court: Does Party Affiliation Matter?
(1980) (unpublished article on fle with the author).
9 Landes & Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and
Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. 11v. 1274 (1980).10 Harris & Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Response to
Landes and Posner, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1280 (1980).
11 See, e.g., Harris & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 275-99.
12 It should be clear that our focus here is with the desirability, as a matter of
antitrust policy, of the implications of Harris and Sullivan's analysis. We take the
view that the justification of antitrust, and indeed of any economic analysis relying
on perfect competition as a standard, stems from the welfare properties of com-
petitive equilibria. See generally B. Bon, THE ANTrus- PAFAmox (1978). In
the context of Harris and Sullivan's Article, our concern is with the policy implica-
tions of "passing-on" as well as with what they refer to as "compensatory justice."
See, e.g., Harris & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 272, 354. As we show below, the
appropriate compensations might be vastly different from those imagined by Harris
and Sullivan; in addition, the identities of any parties to be compensated might also
differ.
I3 Harris & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 277.
'4 See Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the
Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in Smcomm. ONq EcoNoMy nq
Covmuammrr, Jonr EcoN oMc Commnor, 91sr CoNG., 1sT Sass., TEE ANALysiS ANr
EvAUATioN op PuBLic ExruNrruEs: THE PPB SYsmm 47 (Joint Comm. Print
1969).
15 See, e.g., E. MANsrIx., McRoEcoNomcs 268-70 (1970); Harris & Sullivan,
supra note 1, at 282 n.46.
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can be demonstrated: Consider an economy in which one sector is.
constrained to eschew marginal cost pricing. Examine also another
sector that merely happens not to be competitive. Suppose we now
require that this second sector behave competitively. Can we be
sure of a welfare gain? The answer is that, in general, we cannot.16
When there is a residual noncompetitive sector, bringing the rest
of the economy into competitive compliance may actually reduce
welfare.1
7
To illustrate this point, consider an industrial chain that con-
sists of a supplier of an input to a product, a manufacturer of the
product who operates in a competitive output market, and con-
sumers of that product. Let us say the relevant input is transporta-
tion; in particular, unregulated motor carrier service. Suppose
that this service is priced above marginal cost; in addition, it is
recognized that a close substitute, rail service, is constrained by
regulation to maintain its prices above marginal cost.' Finally, it
is assumed for simplicity that the transportation inputs and the
manufacturer's product are produced at constant marginal cost.
Given the preceding assumptions, it is clear that the manufacturer
will pass on the entire motor carrier overcharge to the consumers.' 9
Yet the Illinois Brick holding precludes the consumers from suing
the motor carrier. Applying their general argument, Harris and
Sullivan's conclusion in this situation would be that Illinois Brick
should be overruled because the motor carrier's pricing behavior
has led to a social welfare loss.20
Unfortunately, from the standpoint of economic efficiency, this
conclusion might be incorrect. To demonstrate this, we will
36 See E. MANsrm', supra note 15, at 478; Lipsey & Lancaster, The General
Theory of the Second-Best, 24(1) REv. EcoN. Svto. 11 (1956).
17 This result can also be formulated as follows: When there is a residual non-
competitive sector, forcing a competitive sector to deviate from marginal cost
pricing might actually increase welfare.
1s The analysis to be presented here does not depend on the fact that the sub-
stitute product (here, rail) is a regulated industry. Any uncorrectable exercise of
market power (derived, for instance, from production technologies) will lead to the
same result. The assumption of a regulated industry, however, does simplify the
diagrammatic analysis.
19An analogous example and result is presented by Harris & Sullivan, supra
note 1, at 292.
2 0 Observe that the substitute product is not part of the particular chain of
distribution of interest in classical passing-on analysis (which in this case is the
chain of distribution for motor carrier services). That is, our analysis spotlights, in
a much simplified manner, general equilibrium results as opposed to the partial
equilibrium (single chain) analysis stressed by Harris and Sullivan. Whether the
supply curve in the chain is horizontal, see id. 291 & n.57, is irrelevant to our pur-
poses here.
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analyze the welfare implications of the motor carrier's overcharge
in the input market.21  The manufacturer's demand (D) and the
marginal costs (MC) and prices (P) of motor carrier (t) and rail (r)
service are shown in Figure 1. To simplify matters, it is assumed
that the marginal costs and demands are the same for each service.
Let us suppose that the motor carrier's initial price, Pt', is equal to
marginal cost, but rail's price, Pr, is above marginal cost. The
deadweight loss that results from the rail mark-up is given by area
A in the figure. If the motor carrier's price is then raised above
marginal cost to Pt- (equal to P/), we obtain the following result.
First, given that rail and motor carrier services are substitutes, the
demand for rail will shift to the right (to D/) in response to the
motor carrier's price increase. It should be noted that rail's price
does not change (hence Dt does not shift). The welfare gain asso-
ciated with the increased demand for rail is represented by the
areas A and C (the increased profits to the railroad), plus the area
D, representing increased benefits to shippers. On the other hand,
the welfare loss from the motor carrier's price increase is repre-
sented by area B. By construction, area A is equal to area B.
Hence, these offsetting effects cancel and we are left with a net
welfare gain from the price increase equal to the areas C plus D.2
In essence, although the motor carrier has initiated a mark-up that
has contributed to an increase in allocative efficiency, it could be
the defendant in a consumer suit 23 if Harris and Sullivan's recom-
mendation regarding Illinois Brick were followed.24  It should be
clear, however, that from a social welfare perspective Harris and
Sullivan might not be justified in encouraging such a suit.
25
21The welfare implications of the overcharge can be analyzed in either the
input or output market. See Jacobsen, On the Equivalence of Input and Output
Market Marshallian Surplus Measures, 69 Am. EcoN. REv. 423 (1979).
22 Recalling our earlier discussion, see note 12 supra, it is clear that any coherent
notion of compensatory justice should recognize the benefits accruing in the other
(here, rail) market.
23 Of course, under Illinois Brick, the motor carrier could be a defendant in a
suit brought by a direct purchaser. In this sense, the Supreme Court's assumptions
are as open to challenge as Harris and Sullivan's. But see note 25 infra.
24 When there is precisely one substitute, it can be shown that welfare must
increase with the price set at Pt" because this is the optimal "second best price"
given P' See Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 16, at 11-12.
25Emphasis is placed on the word "might" because it is necessary that the
gainers actually compensate the losers in order for an unambiguous improvement in
social welfare to actually take place.
It is important to note that Harris and Sullivan, Landes and Posner, and the
Supreme Court all accept the premise that the motor carrier should be subject to
suit in this case. Even so, Harris and Sullivan argue that the net effect of over-
ruling Illinois Brick would be an increase in the number of passing-on suits. See
Harris & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 349-54.
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This is a disturbing result for antitrust analysis generally, and
for the analysis of passing on in particular. It suggests that, even
though the Supreme Court might have been wrong in its analysis
of Illinois Brick (as Harris and Sullivan demonstrate), it might still
prove to have been right as a matter of policy. It is not impossible
that the market power exercised in passing-on cases serves to balance
the welfare losses owing to the presence of noncompetitive sectors
elsewhere in the economy.
It is, of course, an empirical question whether such sectors
exist; but there is a substantial literature suggesting that they do.
In particular, competition is generally unworkable in those indus-
tries subject to increasing returns to scale. Examples of industries
of this sort include (or are often thought to include) telephone
services, electric utilities, pipeline transportation, integrated auto
production, typewriters, cement manufacturing, steel production,
and possibly intercity air transportation.26 The relevant issue then
becomes the extent to which non-marginal-cost pricing in these
(and other similar) industries leads to a welfare gain associated with
non-marginal-cost pricing in an industry under passing-on attack.
To the extent that it does, then a policy of restricting the ability of
consumers further down the chain to sue for treble damages (given
that up-stream members are less likely to sue) 27 might be the
correct policy.28
Again, we emphasize that we have no empirical evidence that
the result in Illinois Brick is correct. Indeed, the considerations
26See, e.g., J. BArn, INnusTmA.L ORGANiZAToN ch. 6 (1968) (automobiles,
cement, and steel); A. Fiuni. Az, THE DnmdmA or Frtaar TRANSPORT REu-
ArTIoN (1969) (pipelines); F. SCHERE, INDsTRiAL Muu= STmucirE AND Eco-
NoMIC PmtrovmsAcE ch. 4 (1970) (typewriters); Christensen & Greene, Economics
of Scale in U.S. Electrical Power Generation, 84 J. Por EcoN. 655 (1976) (elec-
trical utilities); Waverman, The Regulation of Intercity Telecommunications, in
Paom o=o CoMPETToN In REcu.ATED MAursrs 201 (A. Phillips ed. 1975)
(telephone services); Caves, Christensen & Tretheway, Scale Economies in the
U.S. Trunk Airline Industry (1980) (unpublished paper on file with the authors)
(intercity air transportation).
27 See note 21 supra.
28 It is worth emphasizing that the analysis we envision is in principle no more
difficult to carry out than that described by Harris and Sullivan. What is required
is an examination of significant cross-elasticities of demand for a given product in
order to identify relevant sectors in which irreducible market power might obtain.
Estimation of cross-elasticities is in principle no more difficult than obtaining own-
price elasticities. Even though Harris and Sullivan appear to believe that results
such as column 13 of their Appendix ("Probability of High Passing On," divided
into four qualitative categories, see Harris & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 355-60) can
serve to delimit the required empirical work, we cannot believe that these results
would be accepted as probative by any court, especially one concerned with
monetary compensatory damages. It would therefore appear that detailed empirical
work will always be required.
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adduced here may fall under Justice White's categorization of the
"economist's hypothetical model." 29 But it should at least give us
pause before concluding too hastily that, as a matter of policy, the
Supreme Court has been leading us down the garden chain.
29 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 732.
